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ATOMIC ENERGY AND WORLD TRADE
ALEY ALLAN*
INTRODUCTION

A few basic facts will determine the pattern of world trade and investment in atomic energy over the next decade. These facts pertain
on the one hand to the nature of atomic energy itself and on the other
to the environment in which atomic development is taking place.
Other facts having to do with the atom and its environment will decide the significant problems, both lay and legal, with which international atomic trade and development will have to contend during
this period. Necessarily treatment of such a broad topic as world
atomic trade must be cursory in the extreme, and some rough and
ready paring of the subject to match the limitations of space is required. Accordingly, there is no attempt here to discuss trade in raw
materials or by-product materials. And there is no discussion of the
important trade in research, test, or special purpose reactors. Attention is focused exclusively on nuclear reactors for power, which is the
heart of the matter. Moreover, most of the discussion is limited to
trade between the United States on the one hand and Western Europe
and Japan on the other. Other areas, such as Brazil and India, which
are on the threshold of industrialization, have acute needs for energy
and may be expected to need significant amounts of atomic goods and
services in the future. It is not to belittle these prospects to observe
that they are not for the time being significant compared with the
needs of Western Europe and Japan. I have not ignored, but have
deliberately disregarded potential trade between the U.S.S.R. and its
satellites, or between the Soviet bloc and other areas. It is too early
to talk intelligently about such possibilities.
In what follows an attempt is made first to arrive at an estimate of
the pattern and the volume of trade in atomic equipment and services
in the areas and for the period under discussion (1960-1970); and then
a brief survey is attempted of the principal problems affecting this
trade. Most of what is discussed is not the usual stuff of a legal periodical. But it will be apparent that a great deal of it has important
implications for lawyers and lawyering. In any case one may be forgiven, perhaps, for trying to describe in skeletal form the context in
which a large volume of important legal transactions of interest to
lawyers in the atomic field will take place during the next decade.
TnE NATURE OF THE DEAND FOR NUCLEAR POWER
The Need for Energy: The primordial fact shaping the form of international atomic trade is the burgeoning increase in demand for energy
* Staff Counsel and Manager of Committee Operations, Atomic Industrial
Forum, Inc.
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all over the world, brought about by a worldwide exploding population growth and a marked trend everywhere towards increased industrialization. There have been estimates that half as much energy in
all forms was consumed in the century ending in 1950 as had previously been consumed in all previous centuries, and that between
1950 and 2000 A.D. the world would need as much again as in preceding
eras.' An over-all rate of growth in need for energy of approximately
three per cent a year has been estimated for the world as a whole.
This would mean a doubling of requirements by 1975 and a four to
five-fold increase by the year 2000.2
In already heavily industrialized areas such as the United States,
Western Europe and Japan the increase in demand for electrical energy, as distinct from other forms, is even more remarkable. A commonly accepted rule of thumb holds that in these areas demands for
electricity are presently doubling every ten years. 3 It is estimated
that the consumption of electricity in Western Europe will be 982
billion kilowatt-hours (982 twh) 4 by 1970, requiring installed electrical
generating capacity of about 246 million kilowatts (246 gw).5 This
compares with a current United States production of 631 twh and
generating capacity of 135 gw.6
The Uses of Nuclear Power: A second basic fact shaping world
atomic trade, but one often overlooked, is that the atom, regarded as
a source of energy, is at present almost exclusively suited for the production of base load electricity in large central power stations. The
consequence of this fact is that nuclear power cannot in the next few
decades play much of a role in meeting the energy needs of underdeveloped areas, but will be chiefly used to fill the growing "energy
7
gap" in industrial areas such as Western Europe and Japan.
1. PUTNAM, ENERGY IN THE FuTURE

231 (1953).

2. Mason, Energy Requirements and Economic growth, 5 NATIONAL PLANNING
Ass'N (1955).
3. ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION [OEEC], SOME AsPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY PROBLEM 14 (1955), a report prepared for the

OEEC by Mr. Louis Armand.
4. A terawatt hour represents about the annual output of one 150,000 watt

power station with a load factor of about 80%.
5. OEEC, THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 1957-1975 34 (1958),
a study of the Electricity Committee of the OEEC. By Western Europe is
meant the area of the Seventeen member countries of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation, which includes the United Kingdom but does
not include Spain. The seventeen countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Western Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.
6. Figures supplied by the Edison Electric Institute, 750 Third Avenue,

New York, N. Y.

7. Opening address of Francis Perrin, French High Commissioner for Atomic
Energy, before the International Conference on Atomic Energy held at Geneva,
Switzerland, in September, 1958. See NETSCHERT & SCHURR, RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE 54-56 (1957); Mason, supra note 2, at 21.
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The reasons for this are not hard to see. First of all, nuclear power
stations have got to be large to be economical. This is because the
inherently expensive nature of many of the elements of a reactor
(e.g., the pressure vessel, control equipment) requires that costs be
spread over as many kilowatts of capacity as possible. Secondly the
establishment of large power stations of any kind requires considerable capital. Capital costs of nuclear power stations are presently
estimated at around $300-$350 per kilowatt of installed capacity, or
roughly twice the capital required for modern conventional stations. 8
A 100 mw nuclear power station, which is not overly large by modern
standards, would therefore cost $30-$35 million. Even if fuel is produced
locally, several million dollars of additional capital will be required to
cover fuel production. Moreover, there is a sizeable foreign exchange
component in almost any power installation, at least for all but heavily
industrialized areas. The experience of the World Bank has been that
anywhere from 35 to 70 per cent of the total capital required for
installation of conventional power stations in underdeveloped areas
must be imported.9 Furthermore if fuel must be imported rather than
produced locally, as will be the case in underdeveloped areas for
nuclear stations as well as thermal stations fueled with coal or oil,
the continuing foreign exchange requirements will be substantial.
Since underdeveloped areas are almost by definition areas which
lack capital and foreign exchange, it can be seen that the construction
of large power stations, and especially nuclear power installations,
will be a difficult matter for them. These difficulties are enhanced
by another frequently overlooked implication of the high capital cost
of nuclear power stations. This is simply that nuclear stations must
be run with as high a degree of continuity as possible in order for
the kilowatt cost to fall within the range of costs of electricity generated at conventional stations. In the jargon of the electrical world,
nuclear power stations must operatb at a much higher load factor than
conventional stations to be economical. Since demand for electricity
is by nature fluctuating, nuclear stations are best suited to the production of electricity to meet that steady demand, called the base load,
which continues night and day throughout the year. For the large
central power station for which nuclear stations are suited this requires the established electrical power grid of a highly industrialized
area. Except in special cases it is impractical to employ nuclear reactors at independent power stations with a necessarily fluctuating
load.
8. For discussions of latest cost estimates of nuclear plants under construction in the United States, see The Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored
by the Atomic Industrial Forum and the National Industrial Conference
Board, MANAGEMENT AND ATOMIc ENERGY 348-63 (1958).
9. Mason, supra note 2, at 25.
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We find ourselves therefore in a situation today where the principal
demand for nuclear power is bound to come from those industrialized
areas of the world where there is a scarcity of conventional fuels. And
this comes down pretty much to Europe and Japan. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union are plentifully supplied with cheap resources of coal, oil and falling water and do not have a pressing need
for power from nuclear fuels at this time. Europe and Japan on the
other hand face an acute shortage of electrical energy, at least at
reasonable prices, unless they take extraordinary measures pretty
soon.'0 The current costs of producing electricity in Western Europe
from new conventional stations are estimated at around 11 to 12 mills
per kwh, and these costs will gradually increase." The equivalent
range for Japan is about 10 to 12 mills per kwh.12 Since electricity
from nuclear reactors can undoubtedly be produced right now in the
range of 10 to 14 mills per kwh,13 and since we may be confident that
these costs will steadily decrease, it is clear that nuclear power will
soon be competitive in Europe and Japan with the most modern
thermal facilities of conventional type. It is worth calling attention
here to another fact peculiar to atomic power: whereas in a particular
conventional power station generating costs may be expected gradually to increase with the age of the system, in a nuclear station lower
costs may be anticipated with time as new improved cores are substituted for old.
Furthermore, in both Europe and Japan, coal is only available at
ever-increasing cost and indigenous resources of oil are limited, 14 so
that increasing reliance now has to be placed upon imported fuels, at
the price of an increasing strain upon external balance of payments.
Since the unique promise of nuclear technology is minimal fuel cost,
the promise of reducing fuel imports is in itself a powerful incentive
toward the exploitation of nuclear energy in Europe and Japan.
10. For Europe, see OEEC, SOME ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY PROBLEM
(1955). See also OEEC, EUROPE'S GROWING NEEDS FOR ENERGY-How CAN THEY
BE MET? (1956); Armand, Etzel and Giordani, A Target for Euratom, a report

submitted in 1957 at the request of the governments of Belgium, France, German
Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Not published.
For content of the report, see N. Y. Times, May 8, 1957, p. 1, col. 1. For
Japan, see Sapir and Van Hynning, The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan,
6 NATIONAL PLANNING AssociATIoN (1956). See also Proceedings of Conference

on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Japanand U. S. Atomic Industrial Forums
(1957).
11. Target for Euratom,ibid.

12. Sapir and Van Hynning, The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan,

NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION 6 (1956).

13. See Proceedings,AIF-NICB Conference, supra note 8, at 348; Proceedings
of Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Japan and U. S. Industrial
Forums (1957).

14. OEEC, EURoPE'S GROWING NEED FOR ENERGY (1956); Sapir and Van Hyn-

ning, The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan, 6 NATIONAL PLANNING AsSOCIATION (1956); Japan and U. S. Industrial Forum, op. cit. supra note 13.
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Finally the experience of Suez has driven home to the Europeans
their precarious dependence upon oil from the Middle East, and this
lesson has certainly not been lost upon the Japanese.
In recognition of their acute need to exploit fully the potential of
nuclear power the Western European nations have already undertaken joint efforts to assure atomic development. A European Nuclear
Energy Agency has been formed under the auspices of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Among other
things this agency is charged with encouraging collective efforts to
establish nuclear facilities in the OEEC area.15 The six nations of
France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries have formed the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), a "supranational"
organization possessing many attributes of sovereignty. As recounted
elsewhere in this symposium, Euratom, established in January 1958,
has already entered into arrangements with the United States Government for a major joint research and development program and a joint
program for the construction of approximately six large nuclear power
stations having a total capacity of 1,000,000 kilowatts (1 gw), the entire
lot to be completed by 1963, or at the latest 1965.16 This joint reactor
program is considered to be only a forerunner to a more comprehensive joint program to be undertaken later.
Military Significance of the Atom: Another significant fact determining the pattern of world trade in atomic energy is the military
significance of the atom. This has a number of consequences, the
chief of which lies in the past. The military importance of the atom
led to tremendous atomic development programs in the United States
and later in the United Kingdom. The United States spent over $13.8
billion between 1940 and 1956 in the development of atomic energy for
,military and peaceful purposes.17 The consequence is that the United
States and Great Britain are the principal reservoirs of trained manpower and technological know-how in the atomic field today, at least
in the western world. For a time therefore those countries that require atomic power will have to obtain atomic equipment and services
and technological knowledge from the United States and the United
Kingdom. At the same time, energy needs being as fundamental as
they are in modern societies, there is a natural propensity on the part
of the energy deficient areas to strive for self-sufficiency as soon as
possible. It is therefore to be expected that the technological advan-

15. OEEC, FIRST
Annex IV (1958);

REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY,
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COM-

mUNITY, March 25, 1957.

16. Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1084 (1958). See also Proposed
Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Euratom, H. R.
Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
17. AEC SEmIANN. REP.

[Financial] (1956).
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tage of the United States and the United Kingdom will be shortlived.
This likelihood is enhanced by the declared readiness of the United
States under its Atoms-for-Peace program to share its atomic technology freely with other friendly nations.1 8
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF ATOMic TRADE

In the light of the facts outlined above it is possible to predict that
over the decade 1960-1970 the primary current of world atomic trade
will flow from the United States and the United Kingdom into Europe,
and that there will be a secondary, but smaller volume from these
same countries to Japan. This trade will probably reach a peak during
the latter half of the decade and thereafter rapidly wane as Europe
and Japan develop their own technology and resources.
The Quantityof Trade
In the following pages an attempt will be made to quantify roughly
the extent of the exports of atomic equipment, materials and services
that will move from the United States to Western Europe and Japan
between now and 1970.
It was noted above that Western Europe will probably have about
246 gw of electrical generating capacity of all forms by 1970.19 In
order to reach this level about 88 gw of new thermal plant will need to
be installed, including replacement of obsolete facilities.20 It is
unlikely that more than a minimum amount of electricity will be
generated in Western Europe from nuclear fuels before 1962, but after
that they will replace thermal fired stations to a greater and greater
extent. The OEEC has estimated that some 25 gw in nuclear capacity
will have been established in the OEEC area by 1970, and that from
2
that point on virtually all power installations will be nuclear. '
18. Address of the President of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 1953. See also Atomic Energy Act §§
123, 124, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153, 2154 (Supp. V, 1958).
19. OEEC, SomE ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY PROBLEM 34 (1955). A
good part of this plant will be in the form of thermal facilities fired by coal,
oil or nuclear fuels. It is estimated that a total capacity of about 166 gw in

thermal plant will be reached by 1970. To reach this level obsolete units will

have to be replaced to the extent of about 10% of new units laid down, besides
net additions to plant.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 39. The estimate of 25 gw of nuclear plant by 1970 may fall short
of what is in fact achieved. The so-called Three Wise Men, appointed in
1953 to consider the nuclear power program of the about-to-be established

European Atomic Energy Community, set 15 gw as a target by 1967 for the
six countries of Euratom alone. See A Target for Euratom, op. cit. supra note

10. Under this assumption one might obtain for all the OEEC countries an
people regard the achievement of this Euratom target as hardly possible,
however, and even Mr. Armand, one of the Three Wise Men and since appointed President of the Euratom Commission, has conceded that achievement
installed nuclear capacity of 15 gw by 1965 and 40 gw more by 1970. Most
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The British have laid down a target of 6 gw of nuclear plant by
1965,2 and it is reasonable to suppose that half the nuclear plants
established in the OEEC area by 1970 will be in the United Kingdom.
This is important since it is assumed for purposes of this discussion
that essentially no goods or services from the United States will go
into the nuclear power program of the United Kingdom. On the estimates made above, therefore, about 12.5 gw would be laid down in
continental Europe by 1970. Of this by far the largest part would be
established in the Euratom area-in all likelihood about 11 gw of the
total. In any case these figures will be assumed in estimating the dollar
magnitude of the atomic equipment, materials, and services that will
be provided from the United States to Europe in the next ten to twelve
years.
In all likelihood the European market will be shared during the
next decade or so by the following main types of proven reactors: the
light water cooled, the organic moderated (in both of which the United
States is pre-eminent), and the gas cooled, which is the mainstay of
United Kingdom technology and of many European programs. Other
concepts including the heavy water moderated and, to a much lesser
extent, the sodium cooled systems, will probably be included in the
latter part of this period. 23 It is assumed for the purposes of the following estimates that none of the goods and services used in the installation of gas cooled reactors will be supplied from the United States.
The components and services which will have to be imported in order
to construct water cooled reactors will be imported exclusively from
the United States and in the case of heavy water systems, to the extent
of about 60 per cent from the United States.
Under these assumptions, it is estimated that the "reactor-mix"
which will be established in Western Europe by 1970 will be as follows:
5 gw
Light water & organic moderated
5 gw
Gas cooled
2 gw
Heavy water
.5 gw
Other
This gives about 6.5 gw of plant capacity for which American concerns
would supply the import requirements.2
of the Euratom 15 gw target by 1967 is unlikely. See ATovIc INDUSTRIAL
FoRuM, INC., FoRuM MEMO (June 1958).
22. Statement by Minister of Power, Lord Mills, in the House of Lords,
United Kingdom, March 5, 1957. See ATO1mac INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., FORUM
MEMO 22 (April 1957).

23. What follows draws heavily on a comprehensive survey of the market
for atomic power products in the next decade prepared by Pickard-Warren-

Lowe Associates for the Atomic Industrial Forum. ATomI'Ic INDUSTRIAL FORUM,
INc., A GROWTH SURVEY OF THE AToIVIIc INDUSTRY 1958-1968 (1958).

24. The Growth Survey estimates a much higher proportion of heavy water
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Equipment and related services
In general the items which would be ordered from United States
suppliers would be special fuel handling and control apparatus, and
fuel cores and core supports, for the United States designed systems.
Other items such as pressure vessels, heat exchangers and main circulation pumps might be supplied at perhaps 40 to 60 per cent of the
total required. In addition architect-engineer services should be in
25
demand from American suppliers for United States designed plants.

On the basis of the above assumptions it can be estimated that
from $0.5-1 billion of equipment and services will be exported from
the United States to Western Europe to build United States type
reactors by 1970. About 1/10 of this, or from $50-100 million can be
estimated for Japan.2
It should be remembered that the rough estimates outlined above
are based on the assumption that approximately equal amounts of
goods will be exported from the United Kingdom to continental Europe
and Japan during the same period of time. Naturally there will be
keen competition among United States and United Kingdom manufacturers for a larger share of this trade and much will depend on
how the United States light water type stands up against the British
gas cooled systems in actual operation. If one proves much better than
the other the shares of the United States and the United Kingdom
in the total volume of trade could change substantially.
reactors and does not mention the organic moderated. Id. at 56. Recent events,
however, most especially the discussions of the joint U.S.-Euratom reactor program, seem to indicate that the organic moderated reactor will play an immediate part in the European programs, whereas the heavy water reactor
system will not come along for some time. Of course these estimates are
"guesstimates."
25. Ibid.
26. Pickard-Warren-Lowe estimate that the equipment and services to be
supplied from the U. S. will range between about $40 to $100 per electrical
kilowatt (ekw), of the total dollars of capital investment per ekw for plants
based on U. S. designs, and the resulting estimate of U. S. equipment and
services for the assumed 6.5 gw U. S. designed reactors would range from
$260 million to $650 million by 1970 or roughly 4 to 3/ of a billion dollars.
This would appear to be a conservative estimate. Another estimate could
be arrived at in a slightly different manner. In the proposed U. S.-Euratom
reactor program $135 million out of a total of $350 million of capital investment will probably be supplied in the form of goods and services from the U. S.
This is a proportion of approximately 40%. If one assumes an average capital
cost of $300 ekw (which is less than the $350 assumed for the Euratom program) then a total capital investment of $1.95 billion of goods and services
would be required for the 6.5 gw of American designed plants estimated to be
constructed in Europe by 1970. Forty per cent of this would give $780 million.
Even assuming that only 25% would have to be supplied from the U. S., a
volume of about % billion dollars in equipment and related services required
for reactor construction would flow from the U. S. to Europe during the
decade 1960-1970. A similar process of reasoning leads to an estimate of about
1/10 of this requirement for Japan for this same period of time or a
total of around $50-$75 million in atomic equipment and services traded between the U. S. and Japan.
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Fuel Materialsand Related Services
The above estimates do not take into account fuel needs for the
United States designed reactors. The United States Government is
at present the only source of supply for enriched fuel required by
American type reactors. 27 It is therefore estimated that the total
fuel requirements for these enriched fuel reactors will be supplied
from the United States. The materials and services relating to the
supply of fuel will be supplied partly from the United States Government and partly from private industry.
Materials and Services from the United States Government: Under
present law in this country enriched uranium, whatever its chemical
28
form, is owned by the United States Government, but under the

United States bilateral agreements program and under the proposed
agreement with Euratom, these materials will be sold and title passed
to foreign governments, including the Euratom Commission.2 9 The
United States stands ready to repossess spent fuel, to reprocess this
fuel for the same price charged United States citizens, and to purchase
any remaining enriched uranium and .ny plutonium found in the
spent fuel.30 Based on the assumptions made above, the total value
of the materials and services relating to fuel supply which will have
to be purchased by Western Europe from the United States Government can be estimated at approximately $350 million, and about 1/10 of
31
this amount or $35 million by Japan.
Materials and Services from Private Firms in the United States:
The job of converting UF6, the material that comes from United
27. The U. K., France, and the U. S. S. R. have facilities for enriching
uranium in its fissionable isotope U-235, but so far as is known none of these

countries have offered enriched material for export.
28. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 §§ 51, 52, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§
2071, 2072 (Supp. V, 1958).
29. The usual AEC power bilateral provides that "the United States Commission will sell or lease, as may be agreed, to the Government of ............
uranium enriched up to 20 per cent in the isotope U-235... ." See, for example,
Article VII of the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the U. S. and
Japan, initiated June 16, 1958. But "in general, special nuclear material distributed abroad under.., power agreements will be sold." See Summary of

General Terms and Conditions Governing InternationalTransactionsin Special
Nuclear Materials, CCH AwOiVrrc ENERGY L. REP. ff 8204 (1956).

30. See statement of Louis L. Strauss, Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and accompanying statements appearing in CCH AToMIc ENERGY L.
REP. § 8204 (1956).
31. The calculation is made in the following manner: We have assumed
that 5.75 gw of the American designed reactors (all but heavy water) to be
established in Western Europe by 1970 will use enriched fuel. Assuming these
are brought on line at a gradually increasing rate it can be roughly calculated
that by 1970 approximately 19.75 gw/years of electricity will have been
produced. This works out at 118 billion 500 million kilowatt hours at a 70%
load factor. The Pickard-Warren-Lowe Growth Survey estimates, supra
note 23, at 63, that costs for slightly enriched large water type reactors for inventory, burn-up (with $12 plutonium credit), reprocessing and transportation, and losses, amount to between 2.8 and 4 mills per kwh. Assuming an aver-
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States isotopic separation facilities, into uranium metal or oxide to
be used as reactor fuel, will probably be done largely by private
chemical processing firms. And the job of fabricating the final fuel
elements will also be done by private manufacturers. Again, based
on the assumptions outlined in preceding pages, it can be estimated
that the total value of such services that will need to be purchased
from the United States by Europe over the decade 1960-1970 will be
around $250 million. Again the figure for Japan ought to be about
32
1/10, or $25 million.
In conclusion, and with due insistence on the extreme roughness
of the calculations, one may expect somewhere around a billion to a
billion and a half dollars of goods and services to be supplied by the
United States to Europe, and between $110-160 million to Japan,
over the next ten years. Of this most would move in private trade,
the greater part in aid of reactor construction, and the rest to supply
the finished reactors with fuel. It should also be emphasized that while
the figures are rough and ready, they are also conservative.
THE PROBLEMS OF ATOMIC TRADE

Atomic trade between the United States on the one hand, and
Europe and Japan on the other, during the period 1960-1970 will
encounter a number of serious problems. Only some of these are
essentially legal in nature though all have a number of elements for
which lawyers' services will be required. Among the non-legal ones,
the problems of finding adequate foreign exchange and capital are
fundamental.
The Foreign Exchange Problem
The estimates given above of the potential export trade from the
United States to Western Europe and Japan are by the same token
a measure of the foreign exchange problem which Europe and Japan
will have in purchasing the goods and services, needed from the
United States. In short, Europe will have to meet a dollar exchange
burden of a billion to a billion and a half dollars, and Japan $100-$150
million, to finance nuclear power generation.
age of 3 mills per kwh over the whole decade 1960-1970, and multiplying
this by the total estimated kilowatt-hours to be produced in this period gives
a total of about $350 million.
32. The calculation can be made as in the earlier case. It can be estimated
that a total of 19.75 gw years of electricity will be produced by the 5.75 U. S.

type enriched fuel reactors by 1970. At a 70% load factor this works out to 118
billion 500 million kw hours. Pickard-Warren-Lowe estimate that the fabrication and conversion charges presently run between 2.6 and 4.4 mills
per kwh. Taking a low of 3 mills as the average cost over the 10-year period
would give a total value of these services of about $350 million. Another $35
million in services might be required for U. S. designed heavy water reactors
giving a total of approximately $400 million. Since fuel manufacturing facilities will undoubtedly be established in Europe as soon as possible it is estimated that only about $250 million of this would be supplied from the U. S.
over the whole decade.
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Alongside total annual European imports of over $20 billion, of
which some $2.5 billion is for coal and oil, an average amount of $150
million a year does not at first glance appear too serious.3 Nevertheless Europe and Japan have had to struggle greatly with the problem
of external trade balances in the past, and the dollar gap, the deficit
on current trade account with the dollar area, has been especially
serious for both since World War II. Recent years have brought a
marked resurgence of the deficit on current account between Europe
and the dollar area. Although in 1953 this deficit had been reduced
to almost zero, it has since been steadily widening until it has reached
a current level of over $2 billion a year.34 Furthermore, the dollar
exchange required for atomic trade is an unusual charge and one
that must be set on top of current normal charges on reserves of
foreign exchange.
It was stated above that one of the primary incentives for the
establishment of nuclear power stations in Europe and Japan was
to save on scarce foreign exchange and that this would result from
the relative cheapness of nuclear fuels compared to coal and oil for
thermal stations. Over the long run this will certainly be true, but
it is doubtful whether this will markedly affect the situation in
the next decade, the principal saving during that time being on
transport. 35 Fuel costs are still a major part of the cost of nuclear
33. OEEC, EUROPE'S
24, 42 (1956).

GROWING NEEDS FOR ENERGY-HOW THEY CAN BE MET

34. OEEC, A DECADE OF COOPERATION 70, 71 (1958).
35. Almost no one now estimates that nuclear fuel costs for enriched fuel
reactors will be reduced to below 3 to 5 mills per kwh during the next decade.
See GROWTH SURVEY, supra note 23, at 63. This may be compared with conventional fuel costs, using hard coal as the basis for comparison, as follows:
It is a generally accepted conversion factor that 0.4 kg of coal is needed to
produce I kwh of electricity in an up-to-date power plant. OEEC, EUROPE'S
GROWING NEEDS FOR ENERGY-HOW THEY CAN BE MET 17 (1956). Assuming an
f.o.b. price for coal of $10 a metric ton, id. at 45, this gives a coal cost of 4 mills
per kwh, or about the same as the nuclear fuel cost to be expected. The savings
from the use of nuclear fuels in Europe over the next decade will therefore
probably be primarily in the cost of transporting conventional fuels. This is
by no means small. Transport costs generally are set by what the traffic will
bear, and have varied from a high of $14 to a low of $5 per ton of coal from
the United States during the last decade. Ibid. The cost of transporting oil is
somewhat less and has been more stable. It would be fair to assume an average of around $5 a ton, figuring oil at its hard coal equivalent value. This was
used by the Euratom Three Wise Men. See Target for Euratom, op. cit. supra,
note 10. Assuming that about 25% of total movements would be in American
bottoms, OEEC, EUROPE'S GROWING NEEDS FOR ENERGY-How THEY CAN BE MET

43 (1956), we have a net foreign exchange burden of $1.25 per ton (hard coal
equivalent) for coal and oil imports which would be saved by a substitution
of nuclear power. We have assumed above that the United States-designed
enriched fuel reactors will produce about 118 billion 500 thousand kwh by 1970
and that U. S. heavy water reactors might bring this up to about 125 billion
kwh. This would represent a savings in coal of about 50 million tons and a
saving of transportation costs of around $65 million. While this is substantial
it is not significant in comparison with the estimated dollar exchange burden
of over $1.5 billion which has been conservatively estimated above for construction and operation of United States type reactors in Europe by 1970.
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power and will constitute a heavy part of the total dollar requirement of establishing United States type reactors in Europe and
Japan between now and 1970. Accordingly, reliance will have to be
placed for a time on special measures for obtaining the necessary
dollar exchange.
Eximbank Loans
One solution to the exchange problem will no doubt come in the
form of major loans from the United States Export-Import Bank
(Ekimbank). A feature of the joint United States-Euratom reactor
program is a long term,- low interest rate Eximbank loan to Euratom
of $135 million, the estimated dollar exchange segment of the total
capital investment required for the program.3 And quite aside from
the Euratom program, the Eximbank last year stated in a public release issued jointly with the United States Atomic Energy Commission that it is "prepared to consider loans to privately owned utility
companies as well as to governments on appropriate terms to finance
the construction of atomic power plants abroad . . . . 37 We may
expect therefore that Eximbank loans will be available to ease the
immediate burden of dollar exchange cost involved in the construction
of United States designed atomic power stations overseas. This should
be an especially effective measure since, after 1970, savings on imports of coal and oil will free substantial amounts of foreign exchange to pay off the loans while in the meantime the special dollar
exchange burden will have been eased.
DeferredFuel Payments
The Atomic Energy Commission may well act to ease this burden
by deferring the obligation of payment for enriched fuel purchased
from the United States Government. An important feature of the
joint United States-Euratom program is deferrals of payment of the
purchase price of initial inventories of enriched fuels for a period of
ten years.3 It would seem likely that similar deferrals will be
offered for fuel inventory needs of future increments of Euratom reactor construction and that the same privilege will be granted to other
cooperating governments in Europe and Japan.
Atoms-for-Peace Grants
It is at least conceivable that the Atoms-for-Peace section of the
36. ProposedAgreement for CooperationBetween the United States and Euratom, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958).
37. Joint Statement by the Chairmanof the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, CCH ATomc ENERGY L. REP.
8209 (1956).

38. Proposed Agreements for Cooperation Between the United States and
Euratom, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 31 (1958).
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Mutual Security legislation will be extended to cover power reactors.3 9
At the present time the Mutual Security Act provides for grants to
other nations to enable them to construct research reactors but not
power reactors. This law might be amended to provide for grant
type assistance in connection with power reactor construction.
The Problem of Capital
Quite aside from the problem of finding necessary foreign exchange,
Western Europe and Japan will face a major problem in raising the
necessary capital to construct nuclear power plants in the next decade.
As can be seen from the much higher prevailing rates of interest in
these countries, capital is a relatively scarcer commodity in these
areas than in the U. S 4 Moreover the money market is reported to
become increasingly tight.41
The problem will be aggravated by the competition for funds from
non-nuclear stations. It has been estimated that a total investment
of approximately $70 billion will be required for power installations
alone in the OEEC area by 1970.4 It is expected nevertheless that
European utilities planning to construct nuclear facilities will be
able to raise through normal channels the capital necessary to finance
at least that portion of the investment that would be required to
construct conventional stations of the same magnitude. Since nuclear
stations cost about twice what conventional thermal installations
cost this would leave half the necessary capital (roughly $3.0 billion
for Continental Europe) to be obtained by special means.
The Dollar Component
Eximbank loans and deferred fuel payments will assist in meeting
part of this need by covering much of the foreign exchange component of the total capital required. 43
As mentioned above in connection with foreign exchange, it is
conceivable that the United States Atoms for Peace program will be
39. Mutual Security Act of 1956 § 12, 70 Stat. 565 (1956), 22 U.S.C. 1939

(Supp. IV, 1937), as amended by the Mutual Security Act of 1957 § 8(n), 71

Stat. 362 (1957), 22 U.S.C. § 1939 (Supp. V, 1958).
40. OEEC,

THE SUPPLY Or CAPITAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN

EUROPE (1957).
41. OEEC, THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 1957-1975, 24 (1958).

42. Id. at 43.

43. The Eximbank loan to Euratom calls for an interest rate of 4% %. This

will be relent in turn by Euratom to private and government utilities in Europe proposing to construct nuclear installations, and while the Euratom loans
will probably be at a higher rate they will probably for incentive purposes be

substantially below the prevailing interest rate in the money market. This
should make this part of the capital costs more freely available than on the
regular money market.

See Proposed Agreements for Cooperation Between

the United States and Euratom, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47
(1958).
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expanded to include assistance for the construction of nuclear power
installations, and this too would make capital available.
The EuropeanInvestment Bank
A European Investment Bank was created by the treaty establishing a European Common Market and charged with the duty of helping to finance projects of interest to two or more of the Euratom
nations which cannot be financed through normal channels. 44 The
European Investment Bank has already assured the Euratom Commission and the United States that the bank will arrange for a sizeable part of the necessary capital for the joint United States-Euratom
program, and presumably its facilities will be available for future in45
crements of construction of nuclear facilities in the Euratom area.
JointProjects
Another possibility for raising capital is by means of joint projects,
for which both the OEEC and Euratom have special provision. The
Euratom treaty provides that "undertakings of outstanding importance
to the development of the nuclear industry in the Euratom community may be constituted as joint enterprises." Approved joint
enterprises may provide for capital participation by outside countries and their nationals and by international organizations. 46 Presumably this capital could take the form of equity as well as debt capital.
Similarly the charter of the OEEC European Nuclear Energy Agency
provides for the formation of "joint undertakings" by groups of member countries. 47 The form of these undertakings is not prescribed, but
it seems clear that a preferred form is an international joint stock
company established under an international convention and providing for ownership of capital shares by governments and their nationals. 48
44. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, pt. 3, Title
IV, March 25, 1957.
45. Id. at 65. See also Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Proposed Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at Ill

(1958).

46. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, March

25, 1957.
47. OEEC, FIRST REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY,
Annex IV, art. V, at 128 (1958).

48. Ibid. OEEC countries have already set up a joint undertaking to erect
a chemical reprocessing plant at Mol, Belgium under a convention establishing
a European commercial company called Eurochemic. This precedent will prob-

ably set the pattern of future joint undertakings of a similar kind. The statute
of this company provides for capital shares initially purchased by the subscribing governments but transferable with the approval of the governing
Board of the company to nationals of a member country. Since these joint
undertakings will have special privileges and assistance from the member

governments, the establishment of such joint companies opens up the possi-

bility of attracting equity capital to the construction of power stations in the

OEEC area.
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Special Government Programs
Finally a number of the Euratom nations apparently intend to adopt
special measures to provide capital for the establishment of nuclear
facilities within their borders, including special governmental sub49
sidies or long-term loans at low interest.
The Tariff Problem
As considered here the tariff problem is simply whether and to
what extent United States suppliers will be at a competitive disadvantage in foreign markets as against suppliers from other countries. In practically all areas protective tariffs confer some competitive advantage upon local citizens as against nationals of foreign
countries. This is a condition that one would expect to hold in the
atomic field as well as others, as long as free trade is not an internationally accepted policy. It is to be hoped, however, that (a) this
competitive advantage will not be so large as to virtually exclude
United States suppliers from important nuclear markets abroad, and
that (b) no market area grants discriminatory advantages as among
nuclear products of different countries.
Over-Protectionof Local Manufacturers
The natural desire of countries who are pressed for foreign exchange
to become independent of foreign sources of supply in the nuclear
field has already been noted. At the present time such countries are
probably more anxious to obtain United States nuclear products than
to exclude them, in order to meet their immediate pressing needs for
nuclear power and to limit their imports of conventional fuel. But
in time we may expect the countries of Western Europe and Japan
to prefer to protect their infant atomic industries by a protective
tariff policy. If United States negotiators wait until that time arrives
to seek protection for United States nationals, their present strong
bargaining position will have been dissipated. It would seem that now
would be the time to negotiate long-term agreements to prevent exclusion of United States products by high tariffs or quotas..
In the case of Euratom, the proposed Agreement for Cooperation
does provide that Euratom will take steps to minimize the impact
of customs duties.50 Since one effect of the Euratom treaty is to
establish a customs union in nuclear materials5 1 with a common tariff
as to goods from outside the Community, whatever tariff Euratom
49. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Proposed
Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 111 (1958).
50. Article X of Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United
States and Euratom, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1958).
51.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ATorIc ENERGY COMMUNITY,

ch. 2, March 25, 1957.

tit. 2,
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adopts will apply to all the six nations of the Community. The level
of this common tariff, both at the beginning and as it may subsequently
52
be amended, will be of vital importance to United States suppliers.
Tariff Discrimination
At the present time Most-Favored-Nation agreements protect United
States products in most markets from discrimination as against products from other outside areas. 53 As far as Japan is concerned, this
will probably continue to be as effective protection as can be demanded. However, the situation may well be different in Europe.
The competition which United States suppliers have most to fear
is British. If the United States were placed at a tariff disadvantage
vis-A-vis the British it could seriously prejudice the United States
position in the European market. At present the United States and the
United Kingdom probably stand on the same footing. In the Euratom
area they will both be subject to a common tariff barrier erected by
the Community. In other countries of Western Europe they are presumably equally protected by Most-Favored-Nation agreements. But
there are presently under way in Europe, under the aegis of the OEEC,
serious negotiations to establish a European-wide free trade area,
including the United Kingdom.5 When and if this is established,
United Kingdom suppliers will no longer be subject to trade barriers
of any kind in respect of transactions with the continental European
area, including Euratom, whereas United States suppliers will still
be subject to the usual national and Euratom barriers. United
Kingdom suppliers would then possess a competitive advantage to the
extent of the tariffs or quotas in force in Europe. Naturally this is a
problem for all United States suppliers to Europe, not just suppliers
of nuclear products. Moreover there are powerful agruments why
the economic well-being of the Western world may depend upon a
certain measure of discrimination against American products in the
European market for a time. But equally powerful free trade arguments are at hand, and in the case of nuclear products there is an
added argument to the effect that it is vitally important for Europe
52. Apparently the Euratom common tariff on source and special nuclear
materials will be virtually nil. But the more important group of nuclear
products as far as U. S. suppliers are concerned, are those items of equipment
that have special application in the nuclear field, including reactors and their
components. The common Euratom tariff on these items will be set in the
next few months. See EURATOM COmm'N, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTION
OF Tm ComvmiuNiTY 50 (1958).

53. Treaty and Protocol between the United States of America and Japan,
art. XIV, April 2, 1953. "Each Party shall accord most-favored-nation treatment to products of the other Party, from whatever place and by whatever
type of carrier arriving... with respect to customs duties and charges of any
kind...."
54. See Bulletin from European Community (May-June 1958), published
by the information constultant to the European Community for Coal and
Steel, Washington, D.C.
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to establish the most efficient and economical power generation system, and that this can only be done by permitting technological
competition among reactor systems on an equal, non-discriminatory
basis. (Although the European Free Trade Area talks have apparently
collapsed just as this symposium goes to press, there are indications
that separate discussions have been held, and may well continue, looking toward the establishment of a special free trade zone for nuclear
products.)
The Nuclear Liability Problem
The problem which will most bedevil atomic trade between the
United States and other countries in the near future is the problem
of nuclear liability. As this term is commonly used it refers to the
legal and financial, as opposed to the physical, consequences of a
serious atomic accident, especially that resulting from claims of
injured members of the public. While it is generally conceded that
the risk of such an accident is almost vanishingly small, the magnitude of the damage that might be done is unprecedently large. And the
public liability that might ensue from such an accident might well
be beyond the financial resources of even the largest corporation.
Under the circumstances it is no wonder that most American companies are reluctant to engage extensively in the shipment of nuclear
supplies abroad without reliable financial protection against the nuclear liability hazard. The problem is the international counterpart
of the one which led the Congress in 1957 to enact the Price-Anderson
Act,55 under which the federal government is bound to indemnify
any parties held liable for a nuclear incident beyond the amount of
insurance or other financial protection available from private sources.
The underlying legal problem reduces itself to the question of who
shall bear, or share, the risk of nuclear liability as among suppliers
of nuclear equipment, operators of nuclear facilities, governments
under whose jurisdiction the nuclear facilities are operated, or the
public.
Our concern in what follows is principally with the problem as
it affects American suppliers of nuclear equipment and services to
reactor installations abroad. Both the nature of the liability that is
risked and the forms of protection against this hazard are a matter
of fundamental and anxious concern to United States organizations
interested in atomic trade with other countries.5 6
The Rules of Liability
It seems clear that United States suppliers will be accessible to
55. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 170, as amended 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. V, 1958).
56. In what follows I have cribbed shamelessly from FIANCIAI PROTECTION
AGAINST ATOavIc HAzARDS: THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, A PRELIENARY REPORT

(1958), the interim report of a study under the auspices of the Harvard Law
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suit by foreign claimants either by way of direct suit in the United
States or by way of enforcement in American courts of judgments
obtained in foreign courts. 57 As a general rule, however, it is unlikely
that either American or foreign courts will impose liability upon
suppliers in the absence of proof of fault, whereas it seems rather
more clear that strict liability will be imposed upon operators of
nuclear facilities in foreign jurisdictions than in the United States.5 8
Under the circumstances one may expect injured parties abroad normally to proceed against the operator of the nuclear facility, at least
in the first instance. Nevertheless, claimants may well seek to recover
from American suppliers in the courts of the United States or in their
own local courts, either because of simple expectation of a larger
recovery or, in the event of a major incident, because of insolvency
or other limitations upon recovery from a facility operator. In view
of the possible scope of damage resulting from a nuclear incident
this is a possibility that United States suppliers would ignore at their
peril, and the risk must be avoided or mitigated if business is to be
done abroad without risk of financial disaster.
PrivateMeasures to Avoid Nuclear Liability
Contractual Arrangements: The most obvious means by which a
United States atomic supplier can protect himself in some measure
from nuclear liability consists of contractual indemnities or "hold
harmless" arrangements with the purchaser-that is, in the usual
case, the reactor operator. This will at least afford protection against
direct suits by the operator to recover over from the supplier for
third party claims enforced against the operator. 59 But it goes without
saying that an agreement with a purchaser cannot bar independent
claims of injured third parties brought directly against a supplier. In
such cases the supplier would be left with the probably sterile right
of a suit to recover from the reactor operator under the contractual
arrangement. In any case the extent of protection afforded by contractual arrangements at best is limited to the assets of the purchaser.
In the event if a major incident, this would be less than complete
protection. Moreover, in European courts contractual "hold harmless"
arrangements may well not be enforced in the face of a plea of "dolus,"
a concept of European law roughly equivalent in modern application
to our concept of wanton or wilful negligence. 0 Since a disregard
School and the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. The director of the study is
Robert Eicholz and the assistant director is Peider Konz. A final report will
be published by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., in January 1959.
57. HARVARD PRELIMINARY REPORT, op. cit. supra note 56, at 12.
58. Id. at 35.
59. The problem of the supplier in protecting himself against claims of the
operator growing out of damage to the reactor property or breach of warranty
of products supplied is beyond the scope of this discussion.
60.

HARVARD PRELIiNARY REPORT, op. cit.

supra note 56, at 33.
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of applicable safety regulations, intentional or unwitting, might well
be considered to be an instance of "dolus," it is readily seen that this
is a major infirmity.61 In some cases the strength of contractual indemnity arrangements might be improved by backing of the local
government, but in most countries this kind of obligation would probably require specific parliamentary approval to be certain of enforce62
ment.
Subsidiaries and Affiliates: Additional protection may be afforded
United States suppliers by operation through foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, or joint enterprises. Under appropriate circumstances the parent company may thus insulate itself from liability. In order to be effective, however, the affiliate will probably have to be an actual operating company, not a mere sales agent for the parent. Otherwise the
parent may be considered to be "present" in the foreign jurisdiction
for purposes of suit on the spot and for enforcement of judgments
in the United States. Moreover, there is always the possibility that
courts may "pierce the corporate veil" where it appears that the subsidiary or affiliate was established merely to avoid liability, especially
if it is undercapitalized. In case of a major incident causing extensive
injury to the public local courts will have a strong incentive to look
63
through corporate veils where possible.
Licensing: Even limiting one's participation in overseas markets to
simple licensing of patents and manufacturing know-how will not
guarantee immunity against liability, although it will pretty clearly
be more difficult to prove fault on the part of a licensor than of a direct
supplier of equipment or services.6
Insurance: Ordinarily the most satisfactory means of financial protection against risks of liability is insurance. Eventually this may be
true of risks from participation by United States suppliers in overseas
markets. But for the time being insurance does not provide adequate
protection. As a practical matter it is not yet even clear what insurance is available. The United States nuclear liability insurance
syndicates, Nelia and Maelu, are reportedly willing to consider applications by United States suppliers for insurance against product
liability on exported articles, but so far they have announced no clear
policy as to the availability of such insurance. Foreign nuclear insurance syndicates have been established, but it is not at all clear
in what amounts or on what terms insurance will be available from
them. 65
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 30, 31.
Austria-Verband der Versicherungsanstalten Oesterreichs, Schwarzen-
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Even in theory insurance is not a complete answer to the problem
of third party liability unless coupled with a firm statutory limitation
of liability or a provision for governmental indemnification beyond
the amount of private insurance available. The unique feature of nuclear liability is the overwhelming size of the total liability in the
event of a major incident. Even in the United States, where the insurance pools are prepared to make available up to $60 million of
insurance for a single installation, far larger than any coverage
hitherto assembled, government indemnification beyond this amount
was thought to be necessary. Present indications are that only a fraction of this amount of insurance will be available to cover foreign
risks, unless a major program for reinsurance of pools in other areas
is subsequently undertaken by United States and United Kingdom
insurers.6
Once it becomes available, insurance will be of immense practical importance, and United States suppliers will be
well-advised to keep up to date on nuclear insurance developments
in Japan and Europe. Meanwhile the measures that will be taken by
governments to limit liability or to afford government indemnification
are of special importance.
GovernmentalMeasures
In all likelihood governmental action of some sort will be required,
either in the form of national legislative action or intergovernmental
agreement, to provide a satisfactory solution to the nuclear liability
problem, both as it affects United States suppliers and as it affects the
atomic industry and the public of other countries. There are several
distinct possibilities.
Action by the United States Government: Congress might extend
bergplatz 7, Vienna III; Belgium-Union Professionnelle des Entreprises d'Assurances Belges et Etrang~res operant en Belgique, 7 rue Guimard, Brussels;
Denmark--Assurandr Societetet, Tordenskjoldsgade 10, Copenhagen; Federal
Republic of Germany-Gesamtverband der Versicherungswirtschaft e.V.,
Eberplatz 1, Cologne; Finland-Suomen Vakuutusyhti6iden Keskusliiton, Bulevardi 28, Helsingfors; France-F6d6ration Fraincaise des Soci6t6s d'Assurances,
3, rue de la Chauss~e d'Antin, Paris 9e; Great Britain-British Insurance Companies European Co-operation Committee, 65/66 Watling Street, London E.C.
4; Greece-F6dration Hell6nique d'Assurances, 10 rue Sina, Athens; Union
des Assureurs de Grace, 6 rue Sophocleous, Athens; Ireland-Irish Insurance
Association, 46/49 Dame Street, Dublin; Italy-Associazione Nazionale fra le
Imprese Assicuratrici, Piazza S. Babila, Milan; Luxembourg-Association des
Compagnies d'Assurances agr6s au Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg, 6 rue de
Bragance; The Netherlands-Nederlandse Unie van Schadeverzekeraars, 163
Riouwstraat, The Hague; Norway-Norske Forsikringsselskapers Forbund,
Tollbodgate 17, Oslo; Portugal-Gremio dos Seguradores, 16 Largo Rafael
Bordalo Pinheiro, Lisbon; Spain-Sindicato Nacional del Seguro, 4 Avenida
Calvo Sotelo, Madrid; Sweden--Svenska F rsikringsbolags Riksfirbund,
Strandv~gen 5 B, Stockholm; Switzerland-Association des Compagnies Suisses
d'Assurances, 43 Gotthardstrasse, Zurich; Turkey-Turkije Sigorta ve Reassurans Sirketleri Birligi, Unyon Han 73/74, Galata-Istanbul.
66. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Proposed

Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1958).
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the coverage of the Price-Anderson Act to foreign nuclear incidents.
This would make available $500 million in United States Government
funds to indemnify any United States supplier held liable for damage
caused by a nuclear incident, on top of any private insurance available. So far the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has not been
receptive to the notion of extending the coverage of the act in this
67
fashion.
Another proposal that has been made is for the United States to
insist as a condition of bilateral agreements for cooperation with
other countries for the foreign government to hold United States
suppliers harmless.68 This has been questioned on the grounds that
it would put United States suppliers at a competitive disadvantage
with suppliers from other countries that do not make a similar demand, notably the United Kingdom. Moreover, it is defective in that
a supplier may have assets or even domicile in a third country, and
suit might be brought there, outside the scope of the defence made
possible by the bilateral agreement.
Other proposals have been to limit the amount recoverable by
foreign claimants in United States courts from American suppliers or
to limit access to the courts in some fashion. Either of these raises
serious constitutional -problems, at least in the absence of treaty.
Action by Foreign Governments: It is possible that other governments will find it advisable to adopt legislation to protect their publics
from nuclear liability which will at the same time protect United
States suppliers. In several countries of Europe legislation of this
sort is under serious study. United Kingdom legislation is considered
in Highton, "The Legal Aspects of Atomic Energy in the United Kingdom," infra,p. 223.
In Germany the principal draft under consideration provides for
(a) strict liability of the owner of a nuclear installation, or possessor
of fissionable material, (b) compulsory insurance or other financial
protection against public liability, (c) government payment of third
party claims not covered by the required financial protection up to a
maximum of 500 million Deutsche Marks (about $125 million) less the
amount of the claims covered by financial protection, and (d) allocation of liability as among parties jointly liable in proportion to their
responsibility.69 Liability to any injured or deceased person is limited
in amount and a double limitation period on "claims is prescribed:
67. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Operation of
AEC Indemnity Act, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 36 (1958).

68. Suggestion of Congressman Sterling Cole. Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1957).
69. Proposed Act on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and on Protection
Against Its Hazards. Document Number 244/58 of the Bundesrat of the German Federal Republic.
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"Two years after the time at which the party entitled to compensation
became aware of the injury and ... thirty years after the damaging
event took place."
In Switzerland legislation is being considered that would (a) make
operators of nuclear installations strictly liable (b) compel them to
carry insurance or equivalent security in the amount of 20 million
Swiss francs ($4.7 million) covering not only themselves but any
party in contractual relation with them who might be held jointly
liable, and (c) authorize compensation to injured parties by the Swiss
Confederation beyond the insurance available. An alternative version
would additionally (d) limit the over-all liability of the operator
and persons jointly liable with him to the amount of the compulsory
insurance, and (e) provide that the Swiss confederation "shall make
good the damage not covered .... ,7
In Japan no draft legislation has yet appeared, but the Japan Atomic
Industrial Forum has undertaken a careful investigation of the nuclear
liability problem. The preliminary report on this study states that "a
special legislative enactment is advisable in order to furnish solutions
to the problem of tort liability arising out of atomic hazards. Points
involved will be strict liability imposed on owners of nuclear facilities
and limitations placed on such liability in view of the enormous size
of damage. No solution, however, will be possible without . . . state
indemnity."' 1 This report will undoubtedly influence legislation pro72
posed in Japan.
Similar measures are under consideration in other countries. They
are good so far as they go, but those that have appeared are subject
to certain major objections from the point of view of United States
suppliers. To the extent that they provide for rather low limits on the
liability of the operator without either providing for government
indemnification or clearly barring recourse against suppliers, they may
create a positive incentive for claimants to pursue suppliers, including
United States concerns, once the limit on an operator's liability has
been reached. Neither the German nor the Swiss legislative proposals
clearly bars independent action against suppliers or actions by a facil70. The draft referred to is the result of the work of a special Commission
composed of. representatives of the federal ministries and of certain private
agencies and thereafter distributed widely for comment by the Swiss Federal
Council, the cabinet or executive arm of the Confederation. The alternative
version referred to consist of variants of certain of the articles suggested by
private groups, in particular insurance circles. The draft is at present with
the Federal Council which will probably pass it on this year to the two
chambers of the Swiss Federal Assembly, the National Council and the Council
of States.
71. Preliminary Report of a Committee for Studies on Atomic Hazards Indemnity of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., entitled FinancialProtection Against Atomic Hazards (June, 1958).
72. Private conversation with Mr. Yoshio Kanazawa, Chairman of the Japan
Forum Atomic Indemnity Committee.
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ity operator to recover from a supplier for claims he has had to pay.
The Swiss draft reserves the Confederation's right "to claim indemnity
from the person liable and from any person jointly and severally
liable" where it is called on to compensate injured parties.
Intergovernmental Agreements: In view of the international participation in nuclear projects and the probability that the effects of any
major nuclear incident will be felt beyond the borders of a single
country, an international convention is probably the only means by
which a comprehensive solution to the nuclear liability problem will
be achieved. 73 It is pretty clear that the International Agency is interested in sponsoring a general convention treating of this problem.
It is equally clear that this will take a long time, and that so far the
Agency has taken no concrete steps in this direction.
The OEEC, however, has for many months had under study by a
group of experts the question of a regional convention or treaty on
third party liability, and has hopes of having a draft convention ready
for initialing by member governments within a matter of months. Although the results of the group's deliberations are still confidential, it is
understood that any proposal will at least subscribe to the following,
among other, principles: (1) that the liability of the facility operator
shall be strict, exclusive, and limited, (2) that up to the limit of his liability, the operator must maintain insurance or some other suitable
form of financial protection to protect all parties potentially liable
for a nuclear incident, (3) that no party other than the operator shall
be liable and recourse actions by the operator against suppliers or
other third parties will not lie. The treaty does n~t itself provide for
governmental, or state, compensation of claimants beyond the limit on
liability, but does require that any state making national arrangements
for additional compensation shall not discriminate against foreigners.
A convention adhering to these principles would protect United States
suppliers in large measure against claims of third parties. However,
to the extent that the ceiling on the operator's liability is set too lowand it may have to be in view of the present limited capacity of the
European insurance market-an open inducement will exist to bring
direct suits in the courts of the United States by injured parties who
cannot recover fully from the operator. It is at least open to question
whether United States courts in such an event would apply the OEEC
convention to bar the action. Since the current draft of the convention
provides for a limit of only $15 million, with participating countries
having the option to set different limits as low as $5 million, it can be
73. Address of Sterling Cole, Director of the International Atomic Energyr
Agency before the Geneva International Conference on Atomic Energy in
September 1958. See also conclusion of HARVARD PRELIMINARY REPORT, op. Citsupranote 56.
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readly seen that the apprehension is not an idle one: in the event of a
major incident pressures to get around the convention would be strong.
It is not yet clear what Euratom will do about this problem. The
draft agreement of cooperation between the United States and Euratorn recognizes the vital importance to the joint reactor program of
finding a solution to the problem,74 but so far there is no clear indication what action will be taken. The Euratom nations are members of
the OEEC and there are indications that Euratom's first step will be
to bring the OEEC convention promptly into force in the Euratom area
if it can. There is some possibility that Euratom may initiate action by
its members to set up a Euratom indemnification fund, out of which
parties injured by a nuclear incident would be indemnified for liability
beyond the limit on private liability set pursuant to the OEEC convention . 5
What form the eventual solution of this formidable problem will
take is problematic. A single comprehensive treaty sponsored by the
International Agency may be adopted. More likely an overlapping
series of acts including national legislation, bilateral agreements,
regional conventions, and a final international treaty covering what
is not otherwise treated, will gradually circumscribe and eventually
erase the problem. Meanwhile it is a major barrier to international
atomic development.
The PatentsProblem
All the signs indicate that Western Europe and Japan will bend
every effort to establish strong indigenous nuclear industries, and
that these areas will not for long continue to be open markets for
American nuclear exports. As time goes on continued participation
by the United States atomic industry in these market areas will therefore probably come to depend more and more upon licensing arrange74. Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between United States and Euratom art. IX, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1958).
"The Government of the United States of America and the Community recognize that adequate measures to protect equipment manufacturers and other
suppliers as well as the participating utilities against now uninsurable risks
are necessary to the implementation of the going program. The Euratom
Commission will seek to develop and to secure the adoption, by the earliest
practicable date, of suitable measures which will provide adequate financial
protection against third party liability. Such measures could involve suitable
indemnification guarantees, national legislation, international convention, or
a combination of such measures."
75. Euratom would appear to be invested with only limited powers, namely
those expressly set out in the Treaty. Consequently effective action on the
liability problem, including the establishment of an indemnification fund, may
depend upon reference back to Member States for formal action. However,
Article 161 of the Euratom Treaty does confer on the Euratom Commission
broad power to "adopt regulations and directives," binding upon Member
States. If liberally construed this authority might be employed by the Commission to prescribe measures for dealing with the liability problem by mandate.
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ments or upon the establishment of operating subsidiaries, affiliates,
or joint enterprises abroad. This will in turn enhance the importance
of patent rights on nuclear technology, both as a basis for licensing
and cross-licensing arrangements and as a bargaining counter in the
negotiations leading to the formation of joint enterprises with European and Japanese companies. Considerable importance therefore attaches to a strong patent position for United States technology in
Western Europe and Japan.
Atomic Energy Commission Policy
In part this is a private and in part a governmental problem. Because so much of the atomic development program in the United
States has been carried on under government contract or other arrangement with the Atomic Energy Commission, a wide range of
the resulting technology is subject to patent rights vested in the
United States Government, and obtaining foreign patent rights on
this technology is a matter of government prerogative.76 A solid patent
position for United States technology in foreign areas therefore depends in large degree upon the extent of AEC efforts in filing for patent
rights abroad. AEC ownership of foreign patent rights does not of
course confer a privileged position on any particular United States
manufacturer, but it does have the beneficial effect of preventing
United States atomic industry from being blocked by competing patents obtained by foreign governments or their nationals from practicing abroad inventions growing out of the United States atomic energy
program. The AEC has recently come in for some criticism on
the grounds that it has not been sufficiently active in seeking foreign
patent rights on inventions owned by it.
It is understood that it is AEC policy to permit a contractor who
has made an invention in the nuclear field to seek foreign patents at
its own expense wherever the AEC decides not to file for foreign
rights itself."7 What is not so clear, however, is whether the Commission's policy requires transfer of title in the resulting foreign patent
to the AEC or simply assignment to it of a royalty-free, non-exclusive
license for governmental purposes. The difference is important.
76. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 152, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §
2182 (Supp. V,1958), provides in part:
"Any invention or discovery, useful in the production or utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy, made or conceived under any contract,
subcontract, arrangement, or other relationship with the Commission, regardless of whether the contract or arrangement involved the expenditure of
funds by the Commission, shall be deemed to have been made or conceived
by the Commission, except that the Commission may waive its claim to any
such invention or discovery if made or conceived by any person at or in
connection with any laboratory under the jurisdiction of the Commission as
provided in section 33, or under such other circumstances as the Commission
may deem appropriate."
77. See Address of Bennett Boskey before the Atomic Industrial Forum
Symposium on International Problems of the Atomic Industry, April 25, 1957.
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(a) To the extent AEC takes the title to patents obtained by its
contractors the principal benefit to United States industry is that it
will not be blocked by competing patents obtained by others.
(b) If on the other hand title to the foreign rights is vested in the
United States concern that goes to the trouble and expense of obtaining them, subject only to a license to the AEC to use the invention
for governmental purposes, then United States concerns have the
incentive to establish a preferential position in foreign markets by
seeking the foreign patent rights on inventions they conceive pursuant
to contract with the AEC. It would improve the situation if the AEC
policy were known more clearly.
Except for secrecy restrictions there is no special barrier to the
filing of applications on nuclear patents in countries abroad by United
States inventors who have conceived their inventions independently
of any arrangement with the government. Presumably United States
nationals may file for nuclear patents on the same basis as patents
may be sought on items of conventional subject matter. United States
applicants thus are subject to the various requirements of national
patent laws, as well as to any special provisions of local atomic energy
laws respecting patents. They are protected from discrimination in
the issuance of patents, however, by United States treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. These customarily provide that United
States nationals and companies will be accorded "national treatment
and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to obtaining and
maintaining patents of invention .... -78 The usual atomic energy
agreement for cooperation, however, is silent on the matter of patent
rights.79 It is at least open to question whether these agreements
should not contain standard provisions on patents, not only to give
assurance of the non-discriminatory application of local patent laws,
but perhaps also to provide that, within the limitations of local law,
patents would be routinely granted on atomic energy inventions certified to one party by the other. Moreover, if it is United States government policy to grant royalty-free licenses to foreign nationals to practice nuclear inventions owned by the United States-and there are
some signs that this is the policy-it would seem that United States
nationals should have assurance of reciprocal treatment by other governments wherever possible.
78. Treaty with Japan, op. cit. supra note 51 at art. X.
79. Bilaterals concerning the exchange of Restricted Data do contain patent
provisions providing for the sharing of patent rights embodying classified information which grow out of the exchange of classified information under the
agreement, and the agreements made with Canada and the U. K. have
similar patent provisions that are applicable to exchanges of unclassified
information as well. But these provisions are not relevant to the rights of
private inventors to establish valid patent rights.
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The EuratomAgreement
The proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States
and Euratom has a special section on patents that will importantly
affect the position of United States atomic industry in the Euratom
area.80 The section has two main parts, one respecting inventions
"made or conceived in the course of or under the joint program of
research and development," and the second relating to any other inventions "used in the work of the joint program."
The first part is reasonably straightforward. It provides that inventions made under the research program shall be shared: the United
States will get the patent rights in its area, and Euratom the rights in
its area. Third country rights will depend on where or under whose
contracts the invention was made. Each party agrees to grant the
other royalty-free licenses for all purposes and assures non-discriminatory treatment to nationals of the other party in licensing its inventions. Since the main focus of the research program is to be fuel
technology, a matter of the keenest interest to the United States as
well as Euratom, both sides stand to gain from sharing their discoveries in this field. 81
The other part of the patent section raises more questions. It provides that any "patents used in the work of the joint program," other
than patents conceived under the research program, which the United
States owns or has the right to license, will be licensed both to "Member States" of Euratom and to their "industries" subject only to the
states agreeing to grant similar rights to the United States Government and United States industry.
A number of troublesome points arise. First, it is not precisely
clear what is meant by "patents used in the work of the joint program." Does this embrace patents outside the nuclear field, i.e., electronic patents involved in reactor control and instrumentation systems? Secondly, it is provided that licenses granted shall cover
"use either in or outside the joint program." This would appear to
mean that any kind of patent owned or subject to license by the
United States which has even incidental use in the joint program
will be available for use by Euratom industrial concerns for any purpose, anywhere, so long as the Euratom states grant the United States
similar rights on inventions owned by them. This seems to go far
beyond atomic development and to raise fundamental questions of
national patent policy.
It is especially not clear whether the provision places the Coin-

80. Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and

Euratom, art. VII, H.R. Doc. No. 441, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 25 (1958).

81. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the Proposed

Euratom Agreements, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 113 (1958).
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mission under a special burden not to grant waivers of governmental
rights to inventions made pursuant to arrangement with the Commission-waivers which in the absence of the Euratom agreement
the Commission might ordinarily be disposed to grant. This has
special pertinence in connection with inventions relating to fuel
elements. Under the Euratom agreement the AEC agrees to provide
guaranties of the price and performance of fuel elements made by
United States manufacturers. These guaranties will be provided for
the benefit of Euratom utilities but apparently will be made by arrangement between the AEC and the United States manufacturer.
If so, a basis exists for the AEC to assert government ownership of
inventions made during the course of manufacturing fuel elements
covered by the guaranty.
The AEC has stated, however, that it has not yet decided whether
it has the legal right to inventions made under the fuel guaranty contracts, but that if it does the Commission will by waiver limit its claims
to the use of such inventions by the U. S. Government "with respect to
construction and operation of government owned reactors."82 Apparently therefore the AEC does not construe the Euratom agreement to
inhibit the waiver of claims on inventions made under the joint program. But the fuel guaranty arrangements may be a special case, and
it is not clear what the effect of the agreement will be on the AEC
waiver policy pursuant to other arrangements between the AEC and
U.S. industry with regard to the joint program.
The Euratom Treaty
The rights of United States inventors in the Euratom area must
of course also be considered in the light of the treaty establishing
Euratom. The treaty raises some complicated questions, most of which
are beyond the scope of this article, but a few observations may be
made. First of all, the treaty appears to leave things pretty much as
they are as far as the issuance of patents on nuclear inventions is
concerned, including the issuance of patent rights to foreign nationals.
The treaty does not set up a single Euratom patent system but leaves
the issuance of patent rights on nuclear inventions, as on other inventions, to the member states.83
But the treaty does contain provisions that will affect the practice
of inventions in the Euratom area, chiefly by providing for the com82. Id. at 230. The Euratom Cooperation Act (P.L. 85-846), section 4(e)
provides, however, that "The Commission shall obtain a royalty-free, nonexclusive, irrevocable license for governmental purposes to any patents on
inventions or discoveries made or conceived by the manufacturer in the
course of development or fabrication of fuel elements during the period covered by the Commission guarantee."
83. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN AToIYC ENERGY COMMUNITY, art. 16,
March 25, 1957.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND WORLD TRADE
pulsory licensing of patents.84 The compulsory licensing provision is
cast in two parts. One grants to the Euratom Community itself and to
Joint Enterprises established by it, the right to non-exclusive licenses
to use inventions "directly connected with nuclear research," including
the right to authorize third parties to use the inventions in carrying
out work for Euratom or its joint enterprises. The second part authorizes Euratom to grant non-exclusive licenses to persons or enterprises
which use patents "relating to inventions directly connected with and
essential to the development of nuclear power in the Community."
This is very broad. Under it, Euratom would appear to have authority
to compel the use by European industry of any patents owned by
United States industry within its area that the Euratom Commission
regards as essential to atomic energy development.
But certain protections exist for the American inventor. First of
all, unless the patent relates to a "specially nuclear subject" Euratom
may not compel the issuance of a license until four years after the
patent was applied for. Secondly, the license to be issued is nonexclusive and an owner of the patent is entitled to "full compensation" for its use. Where the patent owner cannot obtain what he regards as adequate compensation by agreement with the licensee he
may put the case before a special Arbitration Committee. The decisions of the Arbitration Committee are in turn appealable to the Euratom Court of Justice.
Finally United States organizations planning to carry on nuclear
activities within the Euratom Community appear to have reciprocal
rights under the treaty to claim the use of nuclear inventions owned
by Euratom nationals, although it is of course always up to Euratom
to decide whether licensing a United States concern is "essential to
the development of nuclear energy within the Community." United
States nationals would also appear to stand on an equal footing with
Euratom nationals under the treaty in obtaining licenses to use
patents owned by Euratom itself. Under the treaty persons in a position to effectively exploit such inventions are entitled to nonexclusive
licenses on demand, and no distinction is made among persons on
the basis of nationality.85 It could be argued nevertheless that the
position of United States industry would be improved by a formal
agreement under which United States nationals would be entitled
to non-discriminatory treatment under the Euratom treaty.
CONCLUSION

The above discussion barely skates the surface of the problems,
legal and other, that will affect world trade in atomic energy. All the
84. Id. at art. 17 to 23.
85. Id. at art. 12.
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normal problems of doing business internationally and in foreign areas
will have to be contended with by United States organizations exporting nuclear products to foreign areas or attempting to establish operations abroad. Currency, tax, and antitrust problems will affect nuclear
activities as well as others. Moreover, there are a number of special
problems relating to nuclear activities that will have to be wrestled
with, such as licensing under the Atomic Energy Act, health and
safety regulations and security controls established by national governments or international agreement, and a host of other problems
of doing business in the atomic energy field. It is hoped, however, that
the above has served at least to highlight several of the more basic
problems that will affect world trade in the atom, and are bound to
occupy the attention of lawyers in the atomic industry for some time to
come.

